Dr. Evans Duah

# NPP
# PRESIDENTIAL
# PRIMARIES

**Third Public Research**

## Report

**Oct 2025-Jan 2026**

# FOREWORD

**Dr. Evans Duah,** CGMA, ACMA, CA, CEE, CGIA, FCILG, MIOD

This presentation provides a **summarised version of a comprehensive research report** produced to bring **clarity, structure,** and **empirical discipline** to discussions surrounding the **New Patriotic Party (NPP) 2026 presidential primaries**. In **competitive political environments**, analysis is often shaped by **speculation** and **selective interpretation**. This work seeks to ground such discussions in **verifiable data, consistent methodology,** and **clearly stated assumptions**.

The underlying study spans **three survey waves conducted between August 2025** and **January 2026**, anchored to **the outcomes of the 2023 presidential primaries**, and covers all **16 administrative regions** and **276 constituencies**. The research measures **delegate preferences at specific points in time** and interprets their **evolution** using a **transparent analytical framework**. It does not **predict outcomes**, **model turnout**, or **assess campaign execution**. Where uncertainty exists, it is explicitly incorporated through scenario testing.

For **ease of presentation**, **methodological detail and supporting analysis have been condensed in this slide deck**. Readers are encouraged to **consult the full report for comprehensive methodology, detailed tables, limitations, and interpretive context**. The value of this work lies in its **rigour, openness to scrutiny,** and **respect for data** as a basis for informed public discussion.

# PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

1. To systematically examine how delegate preferences within the **New Patriotic Party evolved after the 2024 general election**, recognising that **post-election environments** are characterised by **reassessment** rather than immediate stability.
2. To distinguish between **early post-election** repositioning and **later-stage preference consolidation**, using repeated **measurement** rather than **single-point polling**.
3. To identify **structural patterns** in **national** and **regional delegate preferences** that persist across alternative allocation assumptions.


### Why a Three-Wave Approach Was Used

- Delegate preferences in post-election leadership contests do not stabilise immediately; they evolve as party actors reassess leadership viability, electability, and recovery capacity.
- Single-wave polls capture moments, not processes, and are therefore limited in explaining preference formation after electoral loss.
- A multi-wave design allows the study to separate structural change from temporary fluctuation, improving interpretive reliability.

# RATIONALE FOR A THREE-WAVE DESIGN


**What Each Wave Captures**

- **Wave 1 – August 2025 (Baseline):** Captures early post-election reassessment and initial repositioning relative to the 2023 primaries.
- **Wave 2 – September–October 2025 (Mid-Cycle):** Captures preference filtering, declining undecidedness, and early margin formation.
- **Wave 3 – October 20, 2025 – January 9, 2026 (Final Wave):** Captures late-stage consolidation under reduced uncertainty and heightened strategic clarity.




*Stages of Delegate Preference Evolution After an Electoral Loss*

# SAMPLE AND DATA COLLECTION





### Data Source

### Dataset & Sample

- Total delegates: **204,893** as of October 2025
- Sample: **40,988 delegates (20 %** of Total Population)
- Nonresponse: **9,432 (23.00 %** of Total Sample Size)
- Unreachable: **outdated/wrong contacts**
- Unavailable: **could not engage at the time of the call**

### Fieldwork

- Interviews were conducted via **structured phone calls**, using **verified contact details from the delegate album**.
- Duration: **October 20, 2025 – January 9, 2025.**
- Data collection was organised in **regional blocks,** aligned with candidate tour schedules to reduce availability bias.
  - **Bono, Bono East, Ahafo, Western North**
  - **Central, Western, Volta, Oti**
  - **Northern, Upper West, North East, Savannah, Upper East**
  - **Greater Accra, Eastern, Ashanti**



# SCENARIO CONSTRUCTION

## TWO MODELS AND BIASES

1. **Worst-Case Scenario:** Undecided and undisclosed responses are retained explicitly or assumed to break conservatively, providing a lower-bound estimate.
2. **Best-Case Scenario:** Undecided and undisclosed responses are proportionally allocated across candidates, providing an upper-bound estimate under full crystallisation.

As with all political research, certain limitations apply. The study is subject to **non-contact bias, self-reporting bias inherent in stated preferences, and the absence of turnout modelling.** While extensive measures were taken to ensure accuracy and representativeness, certain limitations apply:

- **Nonresponse Bias:** With **23% of delegates unreachable**, **uncontacted respondent**s may differ systematically from those reached.
- **Regional Homogeneity:** Extrapolations assume **uniform behaviour within constituencies**, though local variations may exist.
- **Temporal Sensitivity:** Sentiment may shift with **ongoing campaign events** or endorsements after the polling window.
- **Measurement Precision:** Regional rounding may cause slight deviations between summed and national totals.

The analysis was conducted at a **95 % confidence level with a margin of error of ±0.5%,** ensuring statistical reliability in comparing candidate performances and interpreting directional trends. **It does not predict outcomes, model turnout behaviour, or attribute causation to isolated events.** Interpretation is grounded strictly in aggregated distributions, temporal consistency, and regional structure.

# METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

## RESEARCH AND ETHICAL STANDARDS

The study followed strict research and ethical protocols to ensure accuracy, transparency, and respondent protection.

- **Enumerators** received **standardized training** on **neutral communication, confidentiality,** and **informed consent** prior to data collection.
- **All participation was voluntary**, with responses collected through **structured telephone interviews** only.
- **Supervisory audits** and **random call-backs** were used to **verify authenticity** and adherence to interview protocols.
- Data was captured through **encrypted digital systems**, **monitored** in **real time**, and analyzed only in **aggregated and anonymized form**.
- No **personal identifiers** or **contact details** are disclosed in this report.
- Findings reflect **validated responses only**, ensuring that **reported patterns represent genuine delegate preferences.**


# NATIONAL RESULTS


## Worst-Case and Best-Case

| Candidate | Worst-Case Votes | Worst-Case Share | Best-Case Votes | Best-Case Share | Change (pp) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kennedy Ohene Agyapong (KOA) | 96,450 | **47.07%** | 107,751 | **52.59%** | 5.52pp |
| Dr. Mahamudu Bawumia (DMB) | 73,607 | **35.93%** | 74,257 | **36.24%** | 0.31pp |
| Dr. Bryan Acheampong (BA) | 16,842 | **8.22%** | 17,621 | **8.60%** | 0.38pp |
| Dr. Yaw Osei Adutwum (YOA) | 4,002 | **1.95%** | 4,197 | **2.05%** | 0.10pp |
| Kwabena Agyei Agyapong (KAA) | 1,002 | **0.49%** | 1,067 | **0.52%** | 0.03pp |
| Undisclosed | 6,080 | **2.97%** | | | |
| Undecided | 6,910 | **3.37%** | | | |
| **Total** | **204,893** | **100%** | **204,893** | **100%** | |

# NATIONAL RESULTS

## Worst-Case and Best-Case




### Worst-Case (Three-Wave Shifts):

**KOA** 41.73% → 44.11% → 47.07% (steady upward consolidation);

**DMB** 39.09% → 39.51% → 35.92% (mid-cycle stability followed by decline);

**DBA** 11.34% → 6.28% → 8.22% (early contraction with partial recovery);

**DYOA** 2.71% → 3.19% → 1.95% (temporary mid-cycle lift, then contraction);

**KAA** 0.63% → 0.60% → 0.49% (consistently marginal).

### Best-Case (Three-Wave Shifts):

**KOA** 51.49% → 53.80% → 52.59% (dominant and stable);

**DMB** 31.26% → 32.21% → 36.24% (late improvement without reordering);


**DBA** 9.38% → 8.27% → 8.60% (contained, margin-shaping);


**DYOA** 2.73% → 4.39% → 2.05% (mid-cycle spike, non-scaling);

**KAA** 0.34% → 1.33% → 0.52% (isolated fluctuation, structurally low).

# NATIONAL RESULTS

## Worst-Case and Best-Case




**KOA** records a **+5.52 percentage-point** increase, markedly larger than any other candidate, reflecting the proportional effect of allocation on an already dominant base. All other candidates show minimal adjustments, with **DMB** at **+0.32 pp**, **DBA** at **+0.38 pp**, **DYOA** at **+0.10 pp**, and **KAA** at **+0.03 pp**, indicating limited exposure to uncertainty-driven uplift.

The chart shows limited sensitivity to allocation assumptions across all candidates. **KOA** records the largest change (**+5.52 pp**), while **DMB** (**+0.32 pp**), **DBA** (**+0.38 pp**), **DYOA** (**+0.10 pp**), and **KAA** (**+0.03 pp**) exhibit minimal shifts. This pattern confirms that allocation affects margins unevenly and does not alter competitive ordering.

# REGIONAL-LEVEL RESULTS

## Worst-Case

| Region | KOA | DMB | DBA | DYOA | KAA | Undisclosed | Undecided | Total Delegates |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ASHANTI | 15,742 | 14,275 | 1,803 | 1,453 | 72 | 1,152 | 1,259 | 35,756 |
| AHAFO | 1,931 | 1,856 | 90 | 41 | 3 | 133 | 145 | 4,199 |
| BONO | 3,870 | 3,000 | 479 | 117 | 14 | 233 | 279 | 7,992 |
| BONO EAST | 3,127 | 3,341 | 409 | 169 | 24 | 234 | 284 | 7,588 |
| CENTRAL | 12,099 | 4,364 | 754 | 150 | 31 | 320 | 409 | 18,127 |
| EASTERN | 8,546 | 3,864 | 6,737 | 433 | 131 | 701 | 821 | 21,233 |
| GREATER ACCRA | 20,285 | 14,381 | 1,866 | 482 | 148 | 944 | 1,028 | 39,134 |
| NORTH EAST | 373 | 2,653 | 132 | 20 | 11 | 152 | 149 | 3,490 |
| NORTHERN | 3,769 | 6,044 | 663 | 233 | 147 | 446 | 503 | 11,805 |
| OTI | 1,943 | 2,104 | 302 | 116 | 58 | 192 | 214 | 4,929 |
| SAVANNAH | 1,562 | 1,723 | 314 | 57 | 28 | 138 | 158 | 3,980 |
| UPPER EAST | 3,524 | 3,286 | 421 | 125 | 69 | 326 | 384 | 8,135 |
| UPPER WEST | 2,358 | 3,200 | 362 | 119 | 79 | 246 | 293 | 6,657 |
| VOLTA | 7,020 | 2,086 | 1,810 | 240 | 131 | 330 | 395 | 12,012 |
| WESTERN | 6,992 | 5,318 | 451 | 155 | 40 | 378 | 400 | 13,734 |
| WESTERN NORTH | 3,309 | 2,112 | 249 | 92 | 16 | 155 | 189 | 6,122 |
| Total | **96,450** | **73,607** | **16,842** | **4,002** | **1,002** | **6,080** | **6,910** | **204,893** |

# REGIONAL-LEVEL RESULTS

## Worst-Case %

| Region | KOA | DMB | DBA | DYOA | KAA | Undisclosed | Undecided | Total Delegates |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ASHANTI | 44.03% | 39.92% | 5.04% | 4.06% | 0.20% | 3.22% | 3.52% | 17.45% |
| AHAFO | 45.99% | 44.20% | 2.14% | 0.98% | 0.07% | 3.17% | 3.45% | 2.05% |
| BONO | 48.42% | 37.54% | 5.99% | 1.46% | 0.18% | 2.92% | 3.49% | 3.90% |
| BONO EAST | 41.21% | 44.03% | 5.39% | 2.23% | 0.32% | 3.08% | 3.74% | 3.70% |
| CENTRAL | 66.75% | 24.07% | 4.16% | 0.83% | 0.17% | 1.77% | 2.26% | 8.85% |
| EASTERN | 40.25% | 18.20% | 31.73% | 2.04% | 0.62% | 3.30% | 3.87% | 10.36% |
| GREATER ACCRA | 51.83% | 36.75% | 4.77% | 1.23% | 0.38% | 2.41% | 2.63% | 19.10% |
| NORTH EAST | 10.69% | 76.02% | 3.78% | 0.57% | 0.32% | 4.36% | 4.27% | 1.70% |
| NORTHERN | 31.93% | 51.20% | 5.62% | 1.97% | 1.25% | 3.78% | 4.26% | 5.76% |
| OTI | 39.42% | 42.69% | 6.13% | 2.35% | 1.18% | 3.90% | 4.34% | 2.41% |
| SAVANNAH | 39.25% | 43.29% | 7.89% | 1.43% | 0.70% | 3.47% | 3.97% | 1.94% |
| UPPER EAST | 43.32% | 40.39% | 5.18% | 1.54% | 0.85% | 4.01% | 4.72% | 3.97% |
| UPPER WEST | 35.42% | 48.07% | 5.44% | 1.79% | 1.19% | 3.70% | 4.40% | 3.25% |
| VOLTA | 58.44% | 17.37% | 15.07% | 2.00% | 1.09% | 2.75% | 3.29% | 5.86% |
| WESTERN | 50.91% | 38.72% | 3.28% | 1.13% | 0.29% | 2.75% | 2.91% | 6.70% |
| WESTERN NORTH | 54.05% | 34.50% | 4.07% | 1.50% | 0.26% | 2.53% | 3.09% | 2.99% |
| Total | **96,450** | **73,607** | **16,842** | **4,002** | **1,002** | **6,080** | **6,910** | **204,893** |
| | **47.10%** | **35.90%** | **8.20%** | **2.00%** | **0.50%** | **3.00%** | **3.40%** | **100%** |

# REGIONAL-LEVEL RESULTS

## Best-Case

| Region | KOA | DMB | DBA | DYOA | KAA | Total Delegates |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ASHANTI | 17,840 | 14,396 | 1,948 | 1,489 | 84 | 35,756 |
| AHAFO | 2,173 | 1,870 | 107 | 45 | 4 | 4,199 |
| BONO | 4,315 | 3,026 | 510 | 125 | 17 | 7,992 |
| BONO EAST | 3,578 | 3,367 | 440 | 177 | 27 | 7,588 |
| CENTRAL | 12,733 | 4,400 | 798 | 161 | 35 | 18,127 |
| EASTERN | 9,870 | 3,940 | 6,828 | 456 | 139 | 21,233 |
| GREATER ACCRA | 22,001 | 14,480 | 1,984 | 512 | 158 | 39,134 |
| NORTH EAST | 635 | 2,668 | 150 | 25 | 13 | 3,490 |
| NORTHERN | 4,595 | 6,091 | 720 | 247 | 152 | 11,805 |
| OTI | 2,296 | 2,124 | 326 | 122 | 60 | 4,929 |
| SAVANNAH | 1,820 | 1,738 | 332 | 61 | 29 | 3,980 |
| UPPER EAST | 4,142 | 3,322 | 464 | 136 | 73 | 8,135 |
| UPPER WEST | 2,827 | 3,227 | 394 | 127 | 82 | 6,657 |
| VOLTA | 7,651 | 2,122 | 1,854 | 251 | 135 | 12,012 |
| WESTERN | 7,669 | 5,357 | 498 | 167 | 44 | 13,734 |
| WESTERN NORTH | 3,608 | 2,129 | 270 | 97 | 18 | 6,122 |
| **Total** | **107,751** | **74,257** | **17,621** | **4,197** | **1,067** | **204,893** |
| | **52.59%** | **36.24%** | **8.60%** | **2.05%** | **0.52%** | **100%** |

# REGIONAL-LEVEL RESULTS

## Best-Case %

| Region | KOA | DMB | DBA | DYOA | KAA | Total Delegates |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ASHANTI | 49.89% | 40.26% | 5.45% | 4.16% | 0.24% | 17.45% |
| AHAFO | 51.75% | 44.53% | 2.54% | 1.08% | 0.10% | 2.05% |
| BONO | 54.00% | 37.86% | 6.38% | 1.56% | 0.21% | 3.90% |
| BONO EAST | 47.15% | 44.37% | 5.80% | 2.33% | 0.35% | 3.70% |
| CENTRAL | 70.24% | 24.28% | 4.40% | 0.89% | 0.19% | 8.85% |
| EASTERN | 46.48% | 18.56% | 32.16% | 2.15% | 0.65% | 10.36% |
| GREATER ACCRA | 56.22% | 37.00% | 5.07% | 1.31% | 0.40% | 19.10% |
| NORTH EAST | 18.19% | 76.45% | 4.30% | 0.70% | 0.36% | 1.70% |
| NORTHERN | 38.92% | 51.60% | 6.10% | 2.09% | 1.29% | 5.76% |
| OTI | 46.59% | 43.10% | 6.62% | 2.48% | 1.22% | 2.41% |
| SAVANNAH | 45.72% | 43.66% | 8.34% | 1.54% | 0.74% | 1.94% |
| UPPER EAST | 50.91% | 40.83% | 5.70% | 1.67% | 0.89% | 3.97% |
| UPPER WEST | 42.47% | 48.47% | 5.92% | 1.91% | 1.23% | 3.25% |
| VOLTA | 63.69% | 17.67% | 15.43% | 2.09% | 1.12% | 5.86% |
| WESTERN | 55.84% | 39.00% | 3.62% | 1.21% | 0.32% | 6.70% |
| WESTERN NORTH | 58.94% | 34.78% | 4.40% | 1.59% | 0.29% | 2.99% |
| Total | **52.59%** | **36.24%** | **8.60%** | **2.05%** | **0.52%** | **100%** |


# REGIONAL-LEVEL RESULTS


## Leaders and vote shares


| Region | Leading Candidate (Worst-Case) | Share | Leading Candidate (Best-Case) | Share |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ashanti | **KOA** | 44.03% | **KOA** | 49.89% |
| Ahafo | **KOA** | 45.99% | **KOA** | 51.75% |
| Bono | **KOA** | 48.42% | **KOA** | 54.00% |
| Bono East | **DMB** | 44.03% | **KOA** | 47.15% |
| Central | **KOA** | 66.75% | **KOA** | 70.24% |
| Eastern | **KOA** | 40.25% | **KOA** | 46.48% |
| Greater Accra | **KOA** | 51.83% | **KOA** | 56.22% |
| North East | **DMB** | 76.02% | **DMB** | 76.45% |
| Northern | **DMB** | 51.20% | **DMB** | 51.60% |
| Oti | **DMB** | 42.69% | **KOA** | 46.59% |
| Savannah | **DMB** | 43.29% | **KOA** | 45.72% |
| Upper East | **KOA** | 43.32% | **KOA** | 50.91% |
| Upper West | **DMB** | 48.07% | **DMB** | 48.47% |
| Volta | **KOA** | 58.44% | **KOA** | 63.69% |
| Western | **KOA** | 50.91% | **KOA** | 55.84% |
| Western North | **KOA** | 54.05% | **KOA** | 58.94% |


# REGIONAL-LEVEL RESULTS

## Worst and Best-Case Scenarios







# REGIONAL DYNAMICS

### Worst-Case and Best-Case

Across the **16 regions**, the **Worst-Case** and **Best-Case scenarios** reveal a consistent national ordering with limited but important regional adjustments. In the Worst-Case scenario, **KOA** leads in **10 regions**, while **DMB** leads in **6**, with the latter's strength concentrated largely in the **Northern belt** and selected transition regions. Under the **Best-Case** scenario, **KOA** expands leadership to **13 regions**, while **DMB** retains leadership in only 3 regions (**North East, Northern, and Upper West**). **This shift does not reflect volatility but rather the systematic allocation of undecided and undisclosed delegates**, which disproportionately benefits the candidate with broader **multi-regional appeal.**



# IMPACT MEASUREMENT

**Kennedy Ohene Agyapong (KOA)**

**KOA** records the largest positive net movement across the three waves, rising from **41.73%** in **August 2025** to **47.07%** in the final wave under **Worst-Case** assumptions, a gain of **+5.35 percentage points,** while recording a **52.59%** in the best-case scenario in the third wave survey. This increase is geographically broad, spanning all major delegate-dense regions, and persists under Best-Case allocation, indicating durability rather than volatility.

The primary drivers of **KOA's** growth appear to be post-election reassessment effects combined with the breadth of ground engagement. **KOA's** gains are strongest in regions with high delegate density, suggesting that incremental persuasion in these regions yields disproportionate national impact. Messaging consistency and perceived resilience following the **2024 loss** align with **Stage 2 (Reassessment)** and **Stage 3 (Preference Filtering)** dynamics in the conceptual framework. Importantly, **KOA's** support shows low sensitivity to uncertainty assumptions, reinforcing its structural character.

# IMPACT MEASUREMENT

**Dr. Mahamudu Bawumia (DMB)**

**DMB** experiences a net decline from **39.09%** in **August 2025** to **35.92%** in the final wave, a change of **–3.17** percentage points. This decline is not uniform; rather, it reflects erosion outside core strongholds while dominance within northern and aligned regions remains strong.

The principal driver of this pattern is post-loss recalibration by delegates who **reassessed electability** and **recovery capacity** following the **2024 general election**. While campaign messaging and visibility remained strong in core regions, gains did not extend meaningfully into delegate-dense southern and middle-belt regions. **DMB's** performance is moderately sensitive to regional weighting rather than to undecided allocation, indicating that structural geography, not late persuasion, constrains national recovery.

# IMPACT MEASUREMENT

**Dr. Bryan Acheampong (DBA)**

**DBA's** trajectory is characterised by **margin influence** rather than **directional momentum**. His support declines from **11.34%** in August to **6.28%** in the second wave, before rebounding to **8.22%** in the final wave. This non-linear pattern suggests **selective consolidation** rather than broad expansion.

**DBA's** impact is strongest in regions with active organisational networks and higher political contestation, where his presence compresses margins between the leading candidates. The drivers here are best understood as ground engagement and organisational familiarity, rather than mass persuasion. **DBA's** support is stable under both scenarios, reinforcing his role as a systemic margin shaper rather than a leadership challenger.

# IMPACT MEASUREMENT

**Dr. Yaw Osei Adutwum (DYOA)**

**DYOA** remains in the low single digits across all waves, ending at **1.95%** nationally under **Worst-Case** assumptions. His support is geographically localized, with modest peaks in **Ashanti** and **Greater Accra**, but shows no evidence of national scaling.

The drivers of **DYOA's** support appear to be sectoral and relational, rooted in specific networks rather than broad delegate recalibration. While his message resonates within limited clusters, it does not intersect strongly with the dominant post-election evaluation criteria shaping the contest.

# IMPACT MEASUREMENT

**Kwabena Agyei Agyapong (KAA)**

**KAA** records the lowest national shares throughout the study, ending at **0.49%** under **Worst-Case** assumptions. His support remains diffuse and consistently below **1%** across regions.

The data suggest that **KAA's** presence functions largely as symbolic participation rather than as an active driver of delegate realignment. There is no evidence of momentum, consolidation, or regional clustering sufficient to alter margins materially.

# CONCLUSION

**Summary**

This study examined how **delegate preferences** within the NPP presidential primaries evolved after the **2024 general election**, using a three-wave nationwide design anchored to the 2023 primaries and based on 31,556 validated interviews out of **40,988 sampled delegates** across all **16 regions** and **276 constituencies**.

The most significant realignment occurred early in the post-election period. By **August 2025**, national ordering had already shifted relative to the **2023 primaries**. Subsequent waves did not reverse this ordering but refined margins as preferences became more structured and undecidedness declined.

Regional **delegate density**, rather than the number of regions carried, explains national outcomes. Strength in delegate-concentrated southern and middle-belt regions exerts disproportionate influence, while geographically concentrated dominance elsewhere reinforces margins without altering national structure.

Fragmentation persists through secondary candidates, shaping competitiveness without national displacement. Declining **undecided** and **undisclosed responses** constrain **late-stage volatility**, shifting the **contest toward consolidation under constraint**.

**The study does not predict outcomes or infer intent**. Its contribution is to document, with **transparency** and **discipline**, the structural terrain within which the primaries will be decided.

# “Numbers tell us who is ahead; strategy decides who stays ahead”

DR. EVANS DUAH